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In this chapter we seek to shed light on the question: “What are the types of fac-
tors that influence individual giving?” In recent years there has been a sustained
effort, in and out of academia, to address this question. While we have learned
a number of things, large areas have yet to be explored. For example, almost all
work has been done on the impact on giving of individual factors, such as ed-
ucation, gender, race, income, and so on. While these are clearly relevant, it is
important to remember that people are also embedded in larger contexts. So,
while their personal income will definitely influence their level of giving, the
wealth or poverty (measured by average income) of their city might also have
a significant effect on how much they give overall and to certain causes.
Based on the aforementioned, it is our belief that in order to understand the
totality of influences on individual giving, we need to include the impact of eco-
nomic, political, and sociocultural environments, or macrofactors, as well as per-
sonal factors. It is also important for nonprofit managers, policymakers, and
community leaders to be aware of the influence of these macrofactors. It may
help to explain why people who have similar personal characteristics but who live
in different contextual circumstances may have different levels of giving. What’s
more, these larger factors change over time, either through planned efforts or for
other reasons. Knowing what impacts on giving these factors have will make pos-
sible predictions of what these changes are likely to mean for giving levels.
Including macrofactors in social research, however, introduces a number of
complications. In the first place, there are measurement errors at both the 
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micro- and macrolevels and combining these types of variables increases the
chances of measurement error affecting the results. Second, the impact of the
macrovariables is likely to be weaker than those of personal characteristics, as
most people are most strongly influenced by the factors closest to them. More
importantly, people are involved in nested, ever larger, systems. These range
from family and/or friends, through a variety of informal and formal organi-
zations, to large geographic units such as cities, states, and nations. Each of
these may have independent impacts, and what’s more, the impacts of higher
level units may be through lower level units. For example, state expenditures
on welfare may influence the level of poverty in a city, which in turn may lead
some people to give more to the poor. Therefore, it is difficult and may be im-
possible to capture fully the effects of the macro variables.
In this research, we investigate the effect on giving of a variety of individual-
level factors that have been included in past research studies. In addition, we
include a number of economic, political, and socioeconomic factors, the effect
on giving of which has not been previously examined, either singly or in con-
junction with individual-level factors. It is clearly beyond the scope of this
chapter to investigate these macroeffects at all possible levels.
Furthermore, lacking international, comparative data, the federal-level
macrodata would not vary much if at all by households, so we cannot use that
data to enhance our estimates. We have, consequently, chosen to measure them
at the state level. While the sheer size of personal income and wealth at the na-
tional level as well as federal expenses and taxes may make national-level
macrodata more important than state-level data for some effects, the lack of
variation in federal data by household makes its inclusion impossible. For ex-
ample, Deb, Wilhelm, Rooney, and Brown (2003) found that changes in wealth
(as proxied by the S&P 500), personal income, giving in the prior year, and the
top marginal tax bracket for households were key predictors of changes in per-
sonal giving by those itemizing deductions on their personal taxes.
Conversely, local-level macrodata may be important because of “propin-
quity effects,” because individuals and families may be more affected by and
may want to more strongly affect what transpires in their local communities.
However, these data are not readily available for this analysis. Therefore, the
state-level macrovariables may have the weakest effects, but it is the level at
which data is most readily available.
We begin with a brief review of the existing literature on the determinants
of giving behavior. From this literature we develop a set of hypotheses about
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the role of macrofactors. We then introduce our data for analysis, and the re-
sults of the tests our hypotheses. After a discussion of these results, we offer
suggestions for policymakers and nonprofit managers.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In their periodic surveys of giving and volunteering, INDEPENDENT SEC-
TOR uses a variety of individual-level variables to help explain the level of giv-
ing. These include individual economic and financial considerations (tax
bracket, level of economic comfort, etc.) as well as motivational factors (desire
to help others, religious involvement, trust in people, etc.). These nationwide
surveys provide the oldest and, currently, the most widely used information on
individual giving in the United States. The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study
(COPPS) is the most comprehensive and largest study of household giving ever
completed (n = 7,400 with thousands of variables). Other recent nationwide
studies of giving have been conducted by the United Way (United Way, 2003)
and by Marshall Marketing and Communications (Lewis, 2003). None of these
surveys considers the influence of larger (macro)factors—such as community
conditions, culture, and government policy. There are reasons to believe that
these factors may also play a part in determining the level of giving. Evidence
for this can be derived from literature that has examined (1) the determinates
of the number of nonprofits in communities (nonprofit presence), and (2) the
interplay between government funding and philanthropy (crowding out).
We have an opportunity to examine the influence of macrofactors in con-
junction with micro-level household data detailed in a nationwide dataset
that has recently become available. The data come from a phone survey of a
large (n = 4,200) cross-sectional, national sample collected in the fall 2001 by
the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. Research participants com-
pleted one of five different surveys of varying lengths, all designed to assess
household charitable giving.
The dataset contains basic demographic information for each individual,
including: gender, race/ethnic, age, education, household income, and marital
status. In addition, each individual will be assigned appropriate values on a
variety of macro-level variables (described later) measured at the state level.
These will include resources and needs, a United Way State of Caring Index,
political culture, top marginal tax rate, and state government expenditures.
These measures will be obtained from secondary sources such as the Census
Bureau, State and County Factbook, and the like.
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The literature on nonprofit presence is important since, as Wolpert (1993)
and Bielefeld, Murdoch, and Waddell (1997) have shown, nonprofit organiza-
tions are largely locally supported. Therefore, factors which have been linked
to the number of nonprofits in a community are likely to be factors that
“work,” to a large degree, through influencing the level of giving in those com-
munities. We should be able to measure the “giving” effect directly.
For example, most research assumes and has found that community needs
and resources (such as income or poverty) will influence the number and dis-
tribution of nonprofit providers (Bielefeld, 2000). This leads to the expecta-
tion that resources such as community income or wealth will foster larger
nonprofit sectors. We assess to what degree needs and resources influence phi-
lanthropy. In addition, given that nonprofits also provide services to middle-
and upper-income patrons, it would be expected that wealthier communities
will have a larger proportion of nonprofits providing services for them (such
as education or arts), along with more giving for these types of organizations.
Community heterogeneity has also been found to influence the presence of
nonprofits (Weisbrod, 1988). As an example, each of the income or minority
ethnic groups in a diverse community might well desire a specialized version
of some service, such as education. Government, with its mandate to serve the
desires of a majority of the voters, will not fill this “heterogeneous demand”
for education. The demand will, instead, be filled by private nonprofit organ-
izations. This leads to the expectation that more economically or ethnically di-
verse communities will have more nonprofit organizations and higher giving
to support them.
The influence of government spending on giving has been extensively studied
and different effects have been found (for a review, see Steinberg, 2003). Some
studies have found that government spending crowds out private giving, while
others have found the opposite, or no effects. This is clearly a complex issue and
more in-depth studies are needed. Our dataset will include both top marginal tax
rates and direct government expenditures as measures to assess crowding out. We
will be able to assess the crowding-out effect both independently of a wide vari-
ety of other variables—something few previous studies have done.
The political scientist Daniel Elazar (1984) has developed a typology of polit-
ical culture that has been extensively used. His framework consists of three po-
litical cultures (moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic) that measure,
among other factors, citizen attitudes about the proper role of government.
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States have been classified on these three cultures (or combinations of them) and
we use these classifications. Elazar’s typology has been related to philanthropy
and the makeup of nonprofit sectors (Bielefeld and Corbin, 1996; Schneider,
1996). Based on this work, it can be expected that communities with moralistic
political cultures will have larger nonprofit sectors; those with individualistic po-
litical cultures should have smaller nonprofit sectors more oriented toward indi-
vidual, entrepreneurial activities; and those with traditionalistic political cultures
should have smaller nonprofit sectors providing traditional and conservative
services. Giving should be consistent with these predictions.
Another political variable that could be considered is party affiliation. States
with more Republicans would be expected to have more conservative popula-
tions, who would be less likely to donate to nonprofits providing welfare ser-
vices. This would be expected to lead to less total (or proportionate) giving.
The effect of generosity has also been examined. In a series of studies, Julian
Wolpert (see for example Wolpert, 1989) has examined levels of generosity in
U.S. cities (as measured by giving to selected causes) and found that commu-
nities varied widely on this factor. We use a thirty-two-factor State of Caring
Index computed for each state by the United Way (http://national.united-
way.org/stateofcaring/) and expect a direct impact on giving.
Our analysis advances theory and research. We are able to measure the ef-
fect of each macro-level variable independent of both individual demo-
graphic variables and other macro-level variables. This should help untangle
the effects of these variables and assess the degree to which individual and
macro variables separately contribute to giving.
The discussion earlier can be summarized in the hypotheses below.
 H1: The higher the top marginal tax rate for a state, the higher the giving
levels because the lower the cost of after-tax giving will be.
 H2: The higher the poverty rate, the lower the giving because while the poor
give a higher share (%) of their income, they give a lower percentage of to-
tal giving.
 H3: The higher the income gap between the top and bottom 5th, the higher
the giving, because (1) differences between rich and poor are greater and
people will respond, and (2) economic diversity will be greater.
 H4: The greater the per capita income, the greater the giving because in-
come is strongly associated with giving.
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 H5: The higher the state expenditures, or expenditures on health (H6), ed-
ucation (H7), or social services (H8), the lower giving levels will be, because
government spending tends to crowd out private giving.
 H9: The greater the Republican dominance in state legislature, the less the
giving, because conservative values are opposed to public or private welfare.
 H10: In a moralistic political culture giving will be greater, due to a greater
concern for public and private redistribution of income and subsequent
giving to welfare causes.
 H11: In an individualistic political culture, giving will be less, due to a
greater reliance on the market and for-profits to deal with social issues.
 H12: In a traditionalistic political culture giving will be less, due to giving to
a more limited number of causes (those favoring the status quo).
 H13: The greater the number of active charities, the greater the giving, be-
cause there are more organizations likely to ask more people and asking is
associated with giving.
 H14: The higher the United Way State of Caring Index, the greater the giv-
ing due to greater concern for the poor.
FINDINGS
As noted earlier, in the study research participants completed one of five dif-
ferent surveys (modules) of varying formats and lengths, all designed to assess
household charitable giving. The goal of that research was to measure the ef-
fect of the various ways of asking about giving that have been used in previous
research. (See Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish [forthcoming] for a detailed
discussion of these results and the methodological issues addressed, Rooney,
Chin, Mesch, and Steinberg [forthcoming] for an analysis of differences in giv-
ing by race and gender using the same dataset, as well as Steinberg and Rooney
[forthcoming] for an examination of giving following 9/11.) For the purposes
of this analysis, we have combined the results of these various surveys, and four
dummy variables (PSID Module, etc.) are included in the analysis to control
for the effects of the respondent taking a particular module.
The analysis computed probit and tobit regression equations for a base model
and then added the various groups of contextual variables to that model. Probit
indicates the change in the probability of a person donating at all for a one-unit
change in the independent variable. Tobit indicates the change in the amount
given for a one-unit change in the independent variable. Its results can be read
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like those of OLS. The difference between tobit and OLS is that tobit adjusts for
a truncated dependent variable—in our case the fact that giving cannot be neg-
ative and that there may be many zeros (nondonors). To simplify the text, we
have these results in an appendix but have used summary tables in the text.
The first step in the analysis, however, was an assessment of the reason-
ableness of using a state level of analysis. Table 7.1 shows basic descriptive data
for the variables in the analysis. These descriptive statistics seem reasonable
and are comparable to other studies. We began our analysis with the base
model variables using dummies for state and region, which were included. In
terms of both probit and tobit results, a few state or regional effects were
found (see tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for detailed results).
INTERPRETATION
Table 7.2 summarizes the directions (positive or negative) of all variable coef-
ficients from Table A3 through Table A8 in the appendix that meet the signif-
icance criteria considered (p  .15, etc.). (Notes: P  Probit and T  Tobit.
The sign and significance of the “base” variables are only indicated in the
“base” columns—even though they are included in each of the “context” re-
gressions. With only a few exceptions, the significance levels of these “base”
variables remain the same across all models and the signs do not change.)
From these significant effects we can draw a number of conclusions re-
garding the pattern of effects found in the base model as well as the effects of
the various groups of contextual variables.
A number of base model variables have consistently positive or negative ef-
fects across total, religious, and nonreligious giving. Age, income, and religion
have consistently positive effects. Less education and minority status have con-
sistently negative effects. Gender and marital status have mixed effects. Gender
has a positive effect in that women have a higher probability of making a do-
nation of any sort and both making a nonreligious donation and the amount
of that donation. On the other hand, women give a smaller donation to reli-
gious causes. Being married leads only to a higher probability of making a non-
religious donation. Religiosity is a positive predictor not only of religious
giving (not a surprise at all) and total giving (not a surprise since religious giv-
ing tends to be a big part of total giving) but also nonreligious giving (which
was somewhat surprising and may be suggestive of future research). Table 7.3
summarizes these results relative to their respective hypotheses.
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Table 7.2. Summary of Direction of Significant Coefficients—Variable Groups 
Entered Separately
Overall Giving Religious Non-Religious
Base Context Base Context Base Context
P T P T P T P T P T P T
Age      
Female    
Married 
Income      
High school or less      
Minority     
Religion   +   
Top Tax Rate
Poverty    
Income gap   
Income per cap  
State Total Exp  
State health exp 
State human exp
State ed exp
% Rep in House
% Rep in Senate 
M  
MI 
IM 
I   
IT
TI
T
Active NPOs
Caring Index   
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Economic contextual variables have mixed effects.
 H1 is not supported. Top tax rate has no effects.
 H2 is partially supported. Poverty leads to a lower probability of making an
overall, religious, on nonreligious donation. On the other hand, it leads to
giving a higher amount to religion. This corroborates the notion that much
of the giving by the poor is to religious organizations.
 H3 is partially supported. The income gap leads to a higher probability in
making any donation and making a nonreligious donation. On the other
hand, it leads to giving a smaller amount to religious causes.
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 H4 is partially supported. Income per capita leads both to a lower probabil-
ity of making any donation and giving more to religious causes.
State expenditure variables have only a few effects.
 H5 to H8 (crowding out) are partially supported. Per capita total state expendi-
tures lead to a higher probability of making any donation and a lower proba-
bility of making a donation to nonreligious causes. Per capita state expenditures
on health lead to a lower probability of donating to nonreligious causes.
For the political variables, a number of effects are found.
 H9 is supported in one finding. The percent of Republicans in the senate
leads to a lower probability of making a donation of any sort.
 H10 though H11 are supported in the pure cultures. A moralistic culture leads
to higher donations overall and higher donations to religious causes (H10).
On the other hand, an individualistic culture leads to a lower degree of giving
to any causes and lower giving to nonreligious causes (H11). In addition,
though, a mixed moralistic/individualistic culture has mixed effects, leading
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Table 7.3. Summary of Hypothesis Tests—Variable Groups Entered Separately
Hypothesis Support Description
H1 None Higher tax rate—higher giving
H2 Partial Higher poverty—lower giving
Found: lower probabilities—higher religious amount 
H3 Partial Higher income gap—higher giving
Found: higher prob overall/non-religious—lower religious amt
H4 Partial Higher per capita income—higher giving
Found: higher religious amount - lower prob. overall 
H5 Partial Higher total state spending—lower giving
Found: lower prob. non-religious—higher prob. overall
H6 Partial Higher state health spending—lower giving
Found: lower prob. non-religious
H7 None Higher state education spending—lower giving
H8 None Higher state social service spending—lower giving
H9 Partial Higher Republican dominance—lower giving
Found: lower prob. overall (state senate only)
H10 Yes Moralistic political culture—higher giving
Found: higher amount overall and religious (pure type only)
H11 Yes Individualistic political culture—lower giving
Found: lower overall & non-religious (pure type only)
H12 None Traditionalistic political culture—lower giving
H13 None Number of active charities—higher giving
H14 Yes United Way State of Caring Index —higher giving
Found: higher prob. overall, religious, non-religious
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to less giving overall and a higher probability of giving to religious causes. H12
(traditionalistic culture) is not supported.
For the social variables, support is found for one hypothesis.
 H13 is not supported. The number of active charities does not effect any of
the aspects of giving considered.
 H14 is supported. The caring index has a positive effect on the probability
of any giving and the probability of giving to both religious and nonreli-
gious causes.
As shown in detail in Table A10 and summarized in Table 7.4, when all con-
textual variables are included in the analysis, a number of the significant effects
noted earlier drop out and several new ones appear. Effects from earlier drop-
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Table 7.4. Summary of Direction of Significant Effects—All Variables in Model
Overall Giving Religious Non-Religious
P T P T P T
Age      
Female    
Married 
Income      
High school or less      
Minority      
Religion      
Top Tax Rate
Poverty
Income gap   
Income per cap 
State Total Exp
State health exp
State human exp 
State ed exp
% Rep in House
% Rep in Senate
M   
MI   
IM
I
IT
TI
T 
Active NPOs 
Caring Index 
05-035 Ch 07.qxd  2/22/05  12:45 PM  Page 138
N E E D ,  C A P A C I T Y ,  G E O G R A P H Y ,  A N D  P O L I T I C S 139
ping out (and hypotheses losing support) include: poverty, total state expendi-
tures, Republican presence in state legislature. In addition, negative support is
found for several hypotheses, including per capita income and traditionalistic
political culture. Finally, however, support for a number of hypotheses remains
or appears. This includes the effects of the income gap, crowding out due to
human services expenditures, the moralistic political culture (and somewhat
for the individualistic political culture in a mixed type), and (for religious giv-
ing) the number of active charities and the UW Caring Index. Table 7.5 sum-
marizes these results with respect to the various hypotheses.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our findings have a number of implications for nonprofit managers and com-
munity leaders. In general, they verify our expectation that both individual-
level variables and macro-level economic, political, and sociocultural
contextual variables have an impact on individual giving. The individual-level
variables in our analysis have been examined in previous studies. Most of
them had strong impacts on giving. In this research they were included in the
same analysis, so the effects of any one can be examined independent of the
Table 7.5. Summary of Hypothesis Tests—All Variables in Model
Hypothesis Support Description
H1 None Higher tax rate—higher giving
H2 None Higher poverty—lower giving
H3 Partial Higher income gap—higher giving
Found: higher prob overall/non-religious—lower religious amt
H4 Opposite Higher per capita income—higher giving
Found: lower prob. overall
H5 None Higher total state spending—lower giving
H6 None Higher state health spending—lower giving
H7 None Higher state education spending—lower giving
H8 Partial Higher state social service spending—lower giving
Found: lower prob of overall
H9 None Higher Republican dominance—lower giving
H10 Partial Moralistic political culture—higher giving
Found: higher prob and amt overall & prob religious
(pure type only)
H11 Partial Individualistic political culture—lower giving
Found: lower prob and amt overall and prob non-religious
(MI type only)
H12 Opposite Traditionalistic political culture—lower giving
Found: higher prob of non-religious (pure type only)
H13 Partial Number of active charities—higher giving
Found: higher amount for religious
H14 Partial United Way State of Caring Index—higher giving
Found: higher prob. for religious
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others. These results, in conjunction with the demographics of particular
communities or organizational donors can help leaders both understand par-
ticular giving levels and design programs to increase giving.
At the macro, contextual level, we examined a variety of variables, which
have not been systematically examined previously. These were examined for
total giving as well as separately for religious and nonreligious giving. In this
analysis we have provided new information to leaders. In summary, we find
that state-level poverty rate, income gap, public expenditures, political cul-
ture, and generosity levels had impacts on giving.
These results can be used to understand how larger environments might
influence giving levels and the reasons for changes in giving levels both in par-
ticular communities and in particular nonprofit organizations. For example,
increases in the poverty rate may partially explain decreases in individual giv-
ing, while increases in the income gap, and state expenditures may partially
account for increases. Those seeking to explain differences in giving between
communities may also look to these variables.
Over and above this, the results can inform efforts by nonprofits and com-
munity leaders to influence levels of giving. Nonprofits can take the results
into account in structuring appeals and community leaders could use them to
inform state or community change efforts. For example, community leaders
can seek to increase state expenditures, noting that this is likely to also result
in higher levels of giving. In terms of political culture, giving is higher in
moralistic cultures. Nonprofits, therefore could seek to solicit gifts in areas
where this culture is prevalent. In addition, efforts can be made to promote
the values this culture is based on, namely that the redistribution of resources
can have positive impacts on community welfare.
We find our results encouraging, especially given that the contextual variables
were measured at the state level, where their effects were likely to be weaker than
at lower-level regional or metropolitan levels because of “propinquity effects,”
and less than the federal level variables because of their sheer “scale effects.” It is
possible that some of the variables that were not significant at the state level may,
in fact, be significant statistically or empirically important at more local or fed-
eral levels. Nonprofit and community leaders should seek to assess these factors
at the levels most important to them, and for many this is likely to be the metro-
politan or rural community level. We expect that the knowledge they accumulate
will help them address important community issues.
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Table A1. Probit—Probability of Giving: Base Model (with State and Region Dummies)
w/ State Dummies w/ Region Dummies
Coeff Sig Coeff Sig
Constant 1.0886 .0121
Age .0007  .0007 
Female .0435 ** .0417 **
Married .0071 .0089
Income .0352 ** .0351 **
High school or less .0786 ** .0795 **
Minority .0577 ** .0531 **
Religion .0927 ** .0926 **
PSID module .0228 .0270 
Area module .0224 .0217
Method module .1669 ** .1641 **
MA module .2190 ** .2162 **
State dummies — —
(None are significant)
Region 7 — — .0366 +
Adjusted R squared .166 .151
  p .15   p .10
*  p .05 **  p .01
Table A2. Tobit—Total Amount Given: Base Model (with State and Region Dummies)
w/ State Dummies w/ Region Dummies
Coeff Sig Coeff Sig
Constant 2111.8  3354.8 **
Age 25.2 ** 25.6 **
Female 131.3 122.6
Married 55.0 67.5
Income 728.1 ** 733.0 **
High school or less 680.9 ** 698.6 **
Minority 518.1 ** 503.3 **
Religion 1799.3 ** 1830.6 **
PSID module 302.4  285.0
Area module 254.6 260.6
Method module 664.8 ** 641.3 **
MA module 1711.3 ** 1713.4 **
SIGMA 3614.2 ** 3643.0 **
MD 2423.0  — —
WV 2040.8  — —
Region 8 — — 472.7 
Log likelihood 27555 27578
  p .15   p .10
*  p .05 **  p .01
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Table A9. Probit—Probability of Giving: Base Model and Contextual Variables
Total Religious Non-Religious
Coeff Sig Coeff Sig Coeff Sig
Constant .1258 .6856  .2901
Age .0007  .0020 ** .0012 *
Female .0419 ** .0032 .0664 **
Married .0097 .0190 .0297 
Income .0350 ** .0349 ** .0409 **
High school or less .0788 ** .0450 * .1045 **
Minority .0529 ** .0515 * .0645 **
Religion .0912 ** .4143 ** .0455 **
PSID module .0238  .1258 ** .2882 **
Area module .0200 .1312 ** .3392 **
Method module .1669 **
MA module .2178 **
Top tax rate .0011 .0064 .0042
Poverty .0057 .0076 .0142
Income gap .0219 ** .0022 .0325 **
Income per cap .0000  .0000 .0000
State total exp 24.740 27.888 25.006
State health exp 7.085 53.211 80.204
State human exp 168.965 * 22.109 72.431
State ed exp 10.752 9.737 18.319
% Rep in House .0098 .0308 .0612
% Rep in Senate .0080 .0326 .0112
M .0476  .0233 .0707 
MI .0897 ** .0057 .1044 
IM .0142 .0237 .0052
I .0112 .0002 .0306
IT .0059 .0141 .0227
TI .0044 .0343 .0036
T .0117 .0133 .0626 
Active NPOs .0000 .0000 .0000
Caring Index .0003 .0009  .0001
Adj R Square .156 .294 .212
  p .15   p .10
*  p .05 **   p .01
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Table A10. Tobit—Total Amount Given: Base Model and Contextual Variables
Total Religious Non-Religious
Coeff Sig Coeff Sig Coeff Sig
Constant 1447.2 3560.7 963.5
Age 25.5 ** 24.2 ** 15.6 **
Female 136.0 301.8  214.2 
Married 57.0 183.0 9.9
Income 727.3 ** 517.8 ** 555.6 **
High school or less 723.0 ** 320.3  634.3 **
Minority 493.7 ** 475.4 * 287.2 
Religion 1819.2 ** 3833.0 ** 438.2 **
PSID module 297.5  953.5 ** 1184.5 **
Area module 233.1 743.8 ** 1520.8 **
Method module 631.0 **
MA module 1707.4 **
SIGMA 3626.6 ** 3489.1 ** 2833.0 **
Top tax rate 11.4 6.9 23.8
Poverty 17.5 4.0 14.2
Income gap 104.1 272.5 * 60.9
Income per cap .02 .03 .02
State total exp 135635 157858 52190
State health exp 90120 450167 179625
State human exp 315489 566703 447575
State ed exp 36530 632623 49465
% Rep in House 183.4 41.8 156.4
% Rep in Senate 273.9 184.6 22.7
M 570.3  273.0 45.9
MI 774.5  851.4 400.7
IM 205.9 119.3 62.7
I 292.5 403.7 375.4
IT 385.7 485.2 132.6
TI 52.8 203.1 287.4
T 49.0 248.1 199.9
Active NPOs .007 .012  .006
Caring Index 1.8 1.4 1.7
Adj R Square 27566 9959 14645
  p .15   p .10
*  p .05 **   p .01
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